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Abstract— Threshold Broadcast Encryption (TBE) is a
promising extension of threshold cryptography with its
advantages over traditional threshold cryptosystems, such as
eliminating the need of a trusted party, the ability of setting up
the system by individual users independently and the ability of
choosing the threshold parameter and the group of privileged
receivers at the time of encryption. An ElGamal-based solution
for TBE was proposed by Ghodosi et al. In this paper, we
propose an improved ElGamal-based TBE scheme with reduced
transmission cost.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While one sender or receiver is capable of executing the
private key operations in traditional public key cryptography,
in threshold cryptography, the number of users required to
sign or decrypt a message must be as high as a specified
threshold value of the system. Threshold cryptography has
numerous applications. It offers a convenient way of private
communication between an individual and an organization
which might be a company, an association, a council or a
governmental agency. There are several papers and surveys [1],
[2], [3], [6], [7], [10], [11], [12] discussing applications and
research aspects of threshold cryptography. A usual scenario
of threshold encryption is that a message is encrypted with a
public key encryption scheme and the corresponding ciphertext
is sent to a group of receivers. In this scenario, a coalition
containing t out of n receivers is eligible to decrypt the
ciphertext whereas any smaller coalitions are not. Such a
scheme is called a (t, n)-threshold encryption scheme.
Every threshold cryptosystem depends on an underlying
secret sharing scheme (SSS). In a SSS, the aim of a coalition
is to obtain the shared secret. The secret sharing problem
and a solution were independently proposed by Shamir [2]
and Blakey [3] in 1979. Shamir’s SSS is highly practical and
is based on a simple polynomial interpolation. This scheme
has been widely used to obtain threshold encryption/signature
schemes for various applications. Several extensions of this
scheme can also be found in the literature[14], [13].
Broadcast encryption (BE) deals with the problem of se-
curely transmitting data to a dynamically changing group of
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privileged users. Any user outside the privileged set should
not be able to recover the message. BE was first proposed by
Fiat and Naor [4] and now it is widely used in digital rights
management applications such as pay-TV, multicast commu-
nication, private streaming and distribution of copyright pro-
tected material such as music and movies. The popular Content
Protection for Recordable Media (CPRM) [5] technology is
also based on BE techniques [15].
The threshold broadcast encryption (TBE) problem was first
introduced by Ghodosi et al. [7]. In their setting, there is a set
of N receivers and a subset of n privileged receivers. The
sender encrypts a message and broadcasts the corresponding
ciphertext to all receivers. To decrypt the ciphertext, a coalition
needs at least t users from the privileged set. TBE has some
advantages over traditional threshold cryptosystems. First, the
need for a trusted party is eliminated and the system can be set
up by individual users independently. Secondly, and perhaps
the most importantly, the sender can choose the privileged set
and the threshold value at the time of encryption which allows
a certain dynamism in the system. Ghodosi et al. proposed a
TBE scheme using ElGamal public key encryption with O(n)
ciphertext size.
In this work, we propose an efficient ElGamal-based TBE
scheme which reduces the transmission cost to O(n− t).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we give an overview of the background material which will be
used in our solution. In Section III, we propose our ElGamal-
based TBE scheme. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The ElGamal Cryptosystem
ElGamal cryptosystem together with its signature
scheme [8] is one of the main public key cryptosystems
today which has yielded many variations. The security of
the ElGamal cryptosystem depends on the hardness of the
discrete logarithm problem. An overview of this scheme is
given below:
• Key Generation: The public and private keys of a user
are generated as follows:
1) Let p be a large prime and g be a generator of Z∗p.
2) Randomly choose the secret key α ∈R Z∗p, and
compute β = gα mod p.
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3) SK = α and PK = (p, g, β) are the private and
public keys of the user, respectively.
• Encryption: To encrypt a message m ∈ Zp for the user
with public key β
1) Choose a random integer k ∈R Z∗p.
2) Compute b = βk mod p
3) Compute the ciphertext c = (c1, c2) where c1 =
gk mod p and c2 = mb mod p.
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext c = (c1, c2)
1) Compute b−1 = c1−α mod p.
2) Compute the message m = b−1c2 mod p.
Here, the factor b is sometimes referred as the masking
factor since it is used to hide the original message m.
B. Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
Suppose the secret d is shared among n users where only a
coalition of size at least t can recover the secret. Such a scheme
is called a (t, n)-secret sharing scheme. In a perfect SSS, a
coalition of size less than t cannot obtain any information
about the secret.
Shamir’s SSS [2] is the first and the best-known SSS in the
literature. Several threshold cryptosystems have been proposed
based on Shamir’s SSS. The scheme works as follows: Let q
be a large prime and d ∈ Zq be the secret to be shared. The






of degree t − 1 from Zq[x] where the constant term is set to
d. The dealer then distributes the secret shares yi = f(i), 1 ≤
i ≤ n, to the ith user.
The reconstruction process is a simple polynomial interpo-
lation to compute f(0) = d. Suppose a coalition S wants to
reconstruct the secret. They can compute the secret polynomial







be the Lagrange coefficient for user i to compute f(j). Then












III. AN ELGAMAL BASED THRESHOLD BROADCAST
ENCRYPTION SCHEME
In broadcast encryption, there is a universal receiver set
U . Before encrypting a message m, certain receivers are
designated as privileged and the ciphertext C is constructed in
a way that only the receivers in the privileged set P ⊆ U can
decrypt C and obtain m. In our setting, we will denote the
cardinalities of the universal and privileged sets (U and P) by
N and n, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume
that U = {1, · · · , N}.
In a TBE scheme with threshold t, only a coalition S ⊆
P with size at least t is allowed to decrypt C and obtain
m. This problem was introduced by Ghodosi et al. [7] who
also proposed the following solution: Let each receiver i ∈ U
have a public-private ElGamal key pair αi and βi where g
and p are common public parameters. By using a combination
of ElGamal encryption and Shamir’s SSS, a ciphertext C is
constructed as follows:
1) For α =
∑
i∈P αi, compute g
α =
∏
i∈P βi mod p.
2) Choose a random ephemeral key k ∈R Z∗p and apply
Shamir’s SSS to generate the shares yi = f(i) for each
i ∈ P in a (t, n)-secret sharing where f(0) = k.
3) The ciphertext is computed as C = (gk mod
p,mgkα mod p, {yiβik mod p : i ∈ P}).
Here the secret share yi for each receiver i ∈ P is encrypted
with the corresponding ElGamal public key βi. Each receiver
in the privileged set obtains a share for k. Since p and gα
are publicly known, after reconstructing k with t shares the
inverse of the mask gkα can be computed hence the message
m can be unmasked. In this TBE scheme, the ciphertext has
size O(n).
A. An Improved ElGamal Based TBE Scheme
Here we propose an improved TBE scheme with a lower
transmission cost than the scheme of Ghodosi et al. [7]
described above. The proposed scheme works along the same
lines as the ID-based scheme of Daza et al. [12]. Our scheme
consists of the following phases:
• Setup: The public parameters of the system are deter-
mined in this phase:
1) Choose a large safe prime p = 2q + 1 where q is
also a large prime. Let g be an element in Z∗p with
order q.
2) Let X = {N +1, N +2, · · · , N +(n− t)} be a set
of n− t integers.
• Key generation: Each receiver i ∈ U generates a public-
private key pair βi and αi as described in Section II-A
and publishes his public key.
• Encryption: Let m be the message to be encrypted for
a privileged set P of n users with a threshold value t.
1) Choose a random ephemeral key k ∈R Zq .
2) Define yi = kαi mod q and compute
ci = βik mod p = gyi mod p
for all i ∈ P .
3) Compute









4) Set c′ = rm mod p
5) Construct the set Y corresponding to the x-





λPij mod p : j ∈ X}
6) Broadcast the ciphertext C = (gk mod p, c′,Y).
The encryption process uses Shamir’s SSS in a slightly
different way. Instead of choosing a random secret poly-
nomial f(x), the sender chooses a random ephemeral
key k and takes f(i) = kαi for all i ∈ P . Unlike the
conventional applications of Shamir’s SSS, the degree
of f(x) is assumed to be n hence the f(i) values for
all i ∈ P determine the polynomial uniquely. Note that,
the sender does not know any f(i) but he can compute
ci = gf(i) = βik mod p since βi is public. Hence the
sender can compute gf(0) mod p without knowing f(0).
To compute the inverse of the mask r, a coalition will
need at least n points on the polynomial. The receivers
are given gf(j) mod p for all x-coordinates j ∈ X with
the ciphertext C. So a coalition containing t privileged
users (i.e. a privileged coalition) can obtain m as follows:
• Decryption: Let C be the ciphertext and S be a privi-
leged coalition.
1) Each user i ∈ S computes
gyi = (gk)αi mod p
2) The coalition computes






3) Compute r−1 and obtain m = r−1c′ mod p
After receiving the ciphertext, a privileged receiver i
computes gf(i) = (gk)αi mod p. Since U ∩ X = ∅
we also know that S ∩ X = ∅ hence any privileged
coalition S has n distinct gf(j) mod p values for all
j ∈ S ∪ X . So r = gf(0) mod p can be computed by
Lagrange interpolation.
This TBE scheme reduces the transmission cost to O(n−t)
from the O(n) cost of the scheme of Ghodosi et al. [7].
B. Security Analysis
The security of the proposed scheme depends on the security
of Shamir’s SSS and ElGamal encryption. First of all, an
attacker cannot decrypt the ciphertext since the ephemeral
key k remains secret even though gk mod p is known. In
the proposed scheme, the ciphertext contains n − t distinct
gf(i) mod p values for a polynomial f(x) of degree n. In
addition to these values, we need at least t extra points to
compute r = gf(0) mod p using Lagrange interpolation.
These t points are obtained by the secret αi values of the
receivers in a privileged coalition, and given that the discrete
logarithm problem is hard in Z∗p, i.e., an adversary cannot
obtain an αi from a βi, our extra points on the polynomial
remain secret. Also, no information can be obtained about
gf(0) mod p by a coalition of size t − 1 because Shamir’s
SSS is perfectly secure.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a threshold broadcast encryption
scheme with a lower transmission complexity than the previ-
ous work by Ghodosi et al. [7]. The security of our system
is based on a threshold ElGamal encryption scheme using
Shamir’s sharing scheme as the underlying SSS.
The ideas used here to construct the TBE scheme can also be
used to propose other TBE schemes based on different public
key cryptosystems. In particular obtaining a similar system
with RSA encryption is an interesting open problem.
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